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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the per-
spective of inductive game theory. We model ethnic interaction as the festival
game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui. We extend the festival game to include
new constraints on observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for
players. These components enable us to study more details of the problem of dis-
crimination. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set. With this characterization,
we see a variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behaviors. Moreover,
using the characterization, we introduce a measure of discrimination and use it to
analyze discriminatory behaviors. Then we discuss our results by comparing them
with some sociological and social psychological studies.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivations for this paper
Discrimination and prejudices are widespread social phenomena and can be found in
any human society in the world, though their degrees of seriousness vary. Among
serious and well known ones, we find discrimination against the Blacks in the US and
against the untouchables in India and some other countries. A less known instance is
the discrimination against the Buraku people in Japan. In addition to these “racial”
∗We thank Amit Prasad, Jeﬀrey J. Kline and Yusuke Narita for various comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. The first author is partially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research
No.17653018, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. The second author is partially supported by
CIBER.
†Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan
(kaneko@shako.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp)
‡Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 330 Wohler’s Hall, 1206
South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820 (amitra@uiuc.edu)
ones, we can also find other types of discrimination such as gender discrimination,
political, economic and religious discrimination. Plenty of such instances are found all
over the world in diﬀerent dimensions (see Marger [16] for a comprehensive survey).
This has been well recognized in social sciences such as sociology, social psychology and
economics. However, more study is needed on the emergence and interrelation between
discrimination and prejudices, particularly at a theoretical level.
In this paper, we will further develop the inductive game theory approach to discrim-
ination and prejudices initiated by Kaneko-Matsui [13]. The approach has two salient
features:
(1): A target social situation is formulated as a (non-cooperative) festival game, where
people are identical except for their symbolic group identities. Still, Nash equilibrium
typically allows discrimination between groups.
(2): The approach is based on inductive game theory, rather than classical ex ante game
theory and evolutionary game theory. No player has a priori knowledge of the game
structure, and their behaviors are based on some beliefs acquired from experiences play-
ing in the game. Interpretations of such experiences may generate prejudices. Recently,
Kaneko-Kline [11], [12] has been developing this theory more extensively.
This paper will add two structures to the festival game of Kaneko-Matsui [13]:
(a) limited observability of ethnicities;
(b) accessibility constraint on individual players.
The first gives a limited capability to distinguish some ethnicities from others. This
enables us to discuss ethnic similarity and ethnic distance, which will be illustrated
in Section 1.3. The second constrains a player’s trials of going to other festivals. An
extreme case is a very conservative society where every player is satisfied by the present
festival and nobody tries to go to another festival. With the introduction of these
two structures to the festival game, the theory will become much richer than that in
Kaneko-Matsui [13].
With these limitations, a variety of discriminatory phenomena are observed in Nash
equilibria. We will investigate the set of Nash equilibria in Sections 3 and 4. In Section
3, we conduct a general analysis of the set of Nash equilibria. In Section 4, a more
specific study of the set of Nash equilibria is conducted under the condition that the
players’ choices of festivals are already given. This study reveals many patterns of
discriminatory behaviors.
However, some of these patterns may include degrees of discrimination in excess of
that needed to sustain a given segregation pattern. We will focus on the minimum degree
of discrimination needed to sustain a given pattern of festival locations, and will define
the measure of discrimination to be this degree. This measure gives various interesting
findings, which will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 7, we give a brief
account of personal views of the social environment derived from subjective experiences
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of individuals, and discuss some form of prejudices which can emerge as part of such
views.
1.2. Relations to the Economic Literature
In the literatures of sociology and social psychology, there are many studies of discrimi-
nation and prejudices. These are empirical, descriptive studies and/or (non-mathematical)
theories (cf. Marger [16], Brown [3]). It would be better to have also some mathematical
work to have better understanding of the mechanism of discrimination and prejudices
in the sense of their emergence and interrelations. In the economics literature, we find
several mathematical approaches to discrimination and prejudices other than the in-
ductive game theory approach we adopt in this paper. It would help to understand
our approach itself if we look at those literatures and contrast them with ours. In this
section, we give a brief survey of these literatures.
We start with the race-preference approach given by Becker [2], which is the most
direct application of neoclassical economics. Some prejudicial component of an individ-
ual is expressed as a parameter (decision variable) of his utility function. A criticism is
that expressing prejudices in a utility function is, more or less, equivalent to assuming
what to be explained. It describes some consequences of such a prejudicial component
(see Chan-Eyster [4], for example), but we cannot address the question of how the
mechanism of discrimination and prejudices works.
A more sophisticated approach is the statistical discrimination theory by Arrow
[1] and Phelps [19] (see also Coate-Loury [5]). In this approach, groups of people
have diﬀerent statistical distributions of productivities. However, an employer only has
information about the average productivity of a group. Thus, for employing a worker, he
avoids the person from a group with a lower average productivity. Here, the concept of
prejudice means that only statistical information is taken but individual diﬀerences are
ignored. In this, real or perceived substantive diﬀerences are still assumed statistically
between groups.
The last approach we mention is the cultural-discrimination theory given by Lang
[14]. In this approach, discrimination is caused by a transaction cost incurred by dif-
ferent customs and languages used by diﬀerent groups. The statistical discrimination
theory may be regarded as a special case of this. Nevertheless, this theory is almost
a mathematical translation of what sociologists have discussed in non-mathematical
terms.
We admit that the above theories have merits for understanding of discrimination
and prejudices to the extent that they allow us to consider their consequences. However,
these theories suﬀer from assuming the existence of substantive (statistical or percep-
tional) diﬀerences in groups in that they do not help to understand the mechanism of
discrimination and prejudices. In the literature of sociology and social psychology, it has
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been argued that discrimination and prejudices are, often, from symbolic sources, i.e.,
they can exist without substantive diﬀerences (cf. Brown [3]). Our approach is based
on symbolic sources for discrimination in order to better understand the emergence and
interrelations of discrimination and prejudices1.
1.3. Inductive Game Theory Approach and Some Results
In this section, we describe the basic components of our approach. Since the basic
development will take various steps, here we illustrate some results from Section 6.
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, we adopt the inductive game theory approach
to discrimination and prejudices. In particular, we consider a non-cooperative game
called the festival game. The festival game is played by a population of players who are
symbolically diﬀerentiated with respect to ethnicities. The ethnicity of a player has no
direct eﬀect on available actions and payoﬀs.
The festival game has two stages: In the first, each player independently chooses
a location from the available locations. In the second, each observes the configuration
of ethnicities in the location, and then chooses his attitude — he is either friendly or
unfriendly to the other players in the location. The payoﬀ for him is the mood, i.e.,
the number of friendly players in his festival. Fig.1.1 illustrates a festival game with 3
locations and 3 ethnic groups. When all people are behaving friendly, the height of each
of the 3 rectangles represents the payoﬀ to each player in that location.
The above situation is considered from the viewpoint of inductive game theory. The
game situation is repeated and the players follow some regular behaviors but make trials
and errors once in a while. These trials and errors will give a player some knowledge
about the social responses to his deviant choices. This supports Nash equilibrium,
though players are limited in their trials by the accessibility constraint mentioned in
Section 1.1. Here, we should emphasize that Nash equilibrium is not interpreted in the
standard sense of ex ante rational decisions (Nash [18]).
A major point of this paper is to study discrimination and prejudices. However,
we need a long technical development before reaching results we provide. It would be
convenient for a reader to have an idea of such results without following the rigorous
development. Here we illustrate two results given formally in Section 6.
In Fig.1.1, as stated above, the height of each rectangle represents the size of popu-
lation at the festival, and also represents the mood at the festival when all players are
friendly at their chosen festival. Thus, a player in a smaller rectangle has an incentive
to move to a bigger rectangle. As we show later, Nash equilibrium states that when a
player goes to a bigger festival without coethnic players, he would face discrimination
1The economics literature has also acknowledged the fact that symbolic information may have be-
havioral consequences (Schelling [20] and Matsui [17]).
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Figure 1.1: Ethnic Hierarchy
in the sense that some players at that festival change to the unfriendly action. These
discriminatory responses remove the incentive to move.
One result from Section 6 is the eﬀect of ethnic hierarchy on discrimination, and the
other to be discussed in Section 5 is the eﬀect of ethnic similarity on discrimination.
The first result says that a smaller ethnic group will meet more discrimination than a
larger ethnic group2. In Fig.1.1, anybody of ethnicity e2 meets less discrimination, in
going to location l1, than anybody of e3. On the other hand, the second result states
that when some ethnicities are similar and cannot be distinguished by the people further
away in ethnic distance, the former people are discriminated in the same way by the
latter people. In Fig.1.1, when people of e2 and e3 cannot be distinguished by people
of e1, discrimination is the same for people of e2 and e3 in location l1. Nevertheless, to
keep the segregation pattern in this figure, people of e2 and e3 can distinguish between
themselves, and people of e2 discriminate against people of e3.
2. Festival Game with Limited Access
We start Section 2.1 with an informal description of the festival game. In Section 2.2,
a mathematical formulation of the festival game is given. In Section 2.3, we describe
inductive game theory supporting our analysis of discrimination in terms of Nash equi-
libria.
2This appears not to fit some cases such as historical discrimination in South Africa. In our paper,
the size of an ethnic group is interpreted as the relative group advantage. Thus, a numerically superior
group like the Blacks may be less advantaged than a numerically inferior group like the Indians. See
Marger [16].
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2.1. Festival Game from the Inductive Viewpoint
The festival game is abstracted from social situations in order to study group formation
and distribution of advantages over the groups formed. We emphasize that the people
are only symbolically diﬀerent and that these symbolic diﬀerences become the source
for discrimination against minority groups. To focus on those, we drop the other socio-
economic details including economic institutions. Here, we list main components of the
festival game and their intended interpretations.
F1: Many players of various ethnicities: Since we are interested in social problems, the
target situation involves many players, though mathematically the number of players is
simply assumed to be a finite number. Since we are also interested in the emergence of
discrimination, we minimize the diﬀerence among players, i.e., we consider an extreme
case where the players are identical with respect to available actions and payoﬀs, except
for symbolic diﬀerences called ethnicities. An ethnicity is attached with each player.
F2: Ethnic groups: By an ethnicity, we mean a commonly shared attribute like a race,
a gender, an economic-political class, a religious group, a field in academia etc. Here,
we assume no intrinsic diﬀerences in those ethnicities, that is, the players of the same
ethnicity share no common values at the beginning. Instead, we would like to derive
the spontaneous formation of such groups with shared values.
F3: Locations: There are several locations, from which each player chooses one location
independently. Those locations have no a priori diﬀerences either. This notion is
interpreted as a country, a firm, a club, a conference or a university.
F4: Festivals: A festival is a group of people choosing the same location. Locations
should be distinguished from festivals; for example, a country in the geological sense is
a location, but the people living there form a festival.
F5: Ethnic configuration: After each player comes to one location, he would observe
the ethnic configuration of the location, which means the set of ethnicities present in the
location. We assume that a player does not count the number of people at his location
but observes only the ethnic configuration. This is due to the bounded cognitive abilities
of players and the assumption of many players - F1.
F6: Actions toward others : After the observation of the ethnicity configuration at one’s
location, he chooses either a friendly action or an unfriendly one. The friendly action
expresses cooperation with other people in his festival, with which he enjoys the festival,
but the unfriendly action shows indiﬀerence to the others, with which he does not enjoy
the festival.
F7: Mood of a festival : It represents a group advantage, relative to those of other
festivals. Here, it is defined to be the number of friendly people at the festival. This
group may include various ethnic people, but some ethnicities may not be there. Also,
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it may consist of people of only one ethnicity.3
Thus, the festival game is highly simplified by focusing only on ethnicities and as-
pects of group advantages and by eliminating other socio-economic aspects. On the
other hand, these simplifications enable us to consider quite detailed structures of group
formation together with possible discrimination occurring among ethnic groups. Again,
we emphasize that no discrimination is included in the above description from F1-F7,
but only symbolic diﬀerences exist between ethnicities.
The festival game up to this point was given in Kaneko-Matsui [13]. We introduce
two additional structures, already mentioned in Section 1.1. The first one is limited
observabilities of ethnicities. It is empirical evidence that “visibility ordinarily relates
closely to the degree of inequality between the groups” (Marger [16], p.60). In fact,
visibility depends upon ethnic groups, e.g., from the Whites’ perspective, Blacks are all
similar but from their perspective, some subgroups are still distinguishable. Limited
observabilities of ethnicities are introduced to capture this kind of notion.
F8: Limited observabilities of ethnicities: Some ethnicities are similar or distinct for
some other ethnic people. This is interpreted as reflecting also ethnic distances between
ethnic groups. For similar ethnic groups, they themselves can distinguish between them,
but cannot be distinguished by a group of some ethnic distance. In fact, the ethnic
similarity and distance enable us to discuss various forms of discrimination, illustrated
in Section 1.3.
The other additional structure is limited accessibilities to locations. To discuss this
structure, we need to mention inductive game theory. Mathematically, the festival game
is formulated as an extensive game Γ. Then, we apply Nash equilibrium to this game.
The festival game together with Nash equilibrium describes the social situation of each
point of time (or for some short period), and the entire situation is repeated. This
background of our research is important for the use of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Now, we enter some part of inductive game theory.
The entire situation is a recurrent situation of the festival game Γ:
. . . Γ Γ Γ . . . (2.1)
We do not adopt the standard repeated game approach, where the situation is formu-
lated as a large one-shot game and the Nash equilibrium concept is viewed as describing
an ex ante prediction-decision. This requires the entire game structure to be known to
the players, which is unsuitable to the problem we target4. Instead, in the inductive
3Although, mathematically, the mood is defined to be the number of friendly people, we interpret
the mood as representing the advantage or status of the group relative to the others but not numerical
superiority in some cases.
4See Kaneko [7] for the interpretation of the repeated game approach and its conceptual diﬃculty.
For a more general discussion on the possible interpretations of Nash equilibrium, see Kaneko [9].
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game approach, the starting assumption is that no player has a priori knowledge of
the game structure. Experiences for each player by trial and error are the source for
knowledge/belief of how he should behave. We assume that each player follows some
regular behavior, i.e., the choice of a location and responses to presences of diﬀerent eth-
nic people. Inductive game theory describes how players have constructed their beliefs
about the situation.
Accordingly, we introduce limited accessible locations for player i from the location
he goes regularly.
F9: Limited accessible locations : Recall that in the inductive interpretation mentioned
above, the players have followed the regular behaviors. Then, each sometimes makes
a trial deviation. Limited accessible locations restricts his trials. In this paper, such a
limitation is exogenously given. It is interpreted as meaning that it may be diﬃcult to
experience all the locations, or some players may be lazy or may hesitate to go to some
locations. Such limited experiences will be described by the set of accessible locations
relative to the regular location configuration.
Alternatively, F9 can be interpreted as sociopolitical restrictions on mobility such
as immigration barriers to countries or zoning laws within a country, e.g., the Hukou
system of China. When F9 is regarded as an institutional arrangement, this may be
interpreted as representing an intuitional (or active) discrimination. In this paper, we
do not pursue this interpretation.
2.2. The Festival Game with Limited Observations and Limited Accessible
Locations
The festival game Γ is played by n players 1, ..., n of various ethnicities. The set of
players is denoted by N = {1, ..., n} and the set of ethnicities is given as {e1, ..., eS}.
Let e(·) be a function from N to {e1, ..., eS}. The value e(i) is the ethnicity of player i.
When e = e(i) = e(j), we call i and j coethnic players. There are lT locations available
for festivals, to one of which each player will go.
Now, let us describe the structure of the festival game Γ. The game Γ has two stages:
The first stage (location choice): Each player i simultaneously chooses a location
fi = l from the available locations L0 = {l1, ..., lT}.
The second stage (choices of attitudes): Player i goes to location fi, and ob-
serves the ethnicity configuration of location l. Using this observation, he chooses either
friendly action 1 or unfriendly action 0.
Figure 2.1 gives an illustration of the above situation. There are three locations for
festivals. The total number of players is 18, and one of three ethnicities is attached to
each player. This has only 18 players, but our intention is to consider a large population
for each ethnicity.
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Figure 2.1: Location Choices and Ethnic Configurations
Now, let us give a formal representation of the festival game. The choice of player
i in the first stage is denoted by fi ∈ L0 := {l1, ..., lT}. Thus, the choices of n players
in the first stage are expressed by the vector f = (f1, ..., fn), which we call a location
configuration. In the second stage, player i observes the ethnicity configuration at
location fi, where we define the ethnicity configuration for player i by
Ei(f) = {e(j) : fj = fi and j 6= i}. (2.2)
That is, Ei(f) is the set of ethnicities present at location fi depending upon a location
configuration f = (f1, ..., fn). Also, we define, for l ∈ L0,
El(f) = {e(j) : fj = l and j ∈ N}. (2.3)
This is the ethnic configuration at location l from the objective view. When player i
with fi = l is the only player of ethnicity e(i) at location l, Ei(f) diﬀers from El(f)
because e(i) /∈ Ei(f) but e(i) ∈ El(f).
In the second stage, player i can observe only the ethnicity configuration of location
fi for player i. This means that he neither identifies each individual player nor does he
observe the number of players from each ethnicity at fi. and as stated in F5 of Section
2.1, this assumption is due to bounded abilities of players.
In F8, we explained the additional structure called limited observabilities of eth-
nicities. This is formulated as follows: First, we introduce the binary relation ∼e
(e = e1, ..., eS) over the set of ethnicities {e1, ..., eS}.We assume, for simplicity, that ∼e
is an equivalence relation over {e1, ..., eS} for each e. The expression e0 ∼e e00 means that
any player of ethnicity e does not distinguish between ethnicities e0 and e00. For example,
when the ethnic distances from e to e0 and e00 are large, the players of e may treat e0
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and e00 as the same ethnicities, but the players of e0 and e00 may possibly distinguish
between them.
In the example of Fig.2.1, suppose that ethnicities e2 and e3 are close and have a
large ethnic distance from e1.When the players of e1 can distinguish between e1 and e2
and between e1 and e3 but cannot between e2 and e3, it holds that e1 ¿e1 e2, e1 ¿e1 e3
but e2 ∼e1 e3. When the players of ethnicities e2 and e3 can distinguish between their
ethnicities, it holds that e2 ¿e2 e3 and e2 ¿e3 e3.
We denote the equivalence class of ∼e including e0 by [e0]e := {e00 : e00 ∼e e0}. For
any subset E of {e1, ..., eS}, we define the quotient set
E/ ∼e= {[e0]e : e0 ∈ E}. (2.4)
When player i of ethnicity e is in the festival with the ethnicity configuration E = Ei(f),
he eﬀectively perceives E/ ∼e since some ethnicities are treated as the same for him.
From the viewpoint of game theory, what we are doing is an introduction of a coarser
information partition common to the players of each ethnicity. This notion will be used
for the definition of a strategy.
A strategy for player i of ethnicity e is given as a pair consisting of a location choice
fi ∈ L0 and a function ri : 2{e1,...,eS} → {0, 1} satisfying that for all E,E0 ∈ 2{e1,...,eS},
E/ ∼e= E0/ ∼e implies ri(E) = ri(E0). (2.5)
Here, ri chooses friendly action ri(E) = 1 or unfriendly action ri(E) = 0 depending
upon the ethnicity configuration E = Ei(f) up to his perception of ethnicities. We will
often denote a strategy (fi, ri) for i by σi. Let Σi be the set of all strategies for player i.
A profile of strategies for n players is denoted by σ = (σ1, ...,σn), where σi ∈ Σi for
all i ∈ N.We often write σ = (σ1, ...,σn) as (f, r) = ((f1, ..., fn), (r1, ..., rn)).We denote
the set of strategy profiles by Σ = Σ1 × ...×Σn.
When the players behave according to a profile of strategies σ = (f, r) ∈ Σ, the payoﬀ
to each player i is determined by the mood for him at fi and his attitude determined
by ri. Under a strategy profile σ = (f, r), the mood of festival l is defined as follows:
ml(σ) =
X
fj=l
rj(Ej(f)). (2.6)
Thus, the mood is the total number of friendly people at location l. Now we define the
payoﬀ function of player i by:
Hi(σ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ml(σ) if ri(f) = 1
m0 if ri(f) = 0,
(2.7)
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where the threshold utility m0 is a noninteger greater than 1. Definition (2.7) means
that when he takes a friendly action, his payoﬀ is the mood of his festival, but when
he acts unfriendly, his payoﬀ becomes the threshold utility m0. The threshold m0 may
be interpreted as the utility from staying at home. The nonintegerness of m0 is to
avoid tie-situations between unfriendly and friendly actions. Beyond m0, the choice of
a friendly action is preferred to the choice of an unfriendly action.
In the example of Fig.2.1, when all the players in location l1 take friendly actions,
the mood would be 11, and is the payoﬀ for each player there. If two players among
them take unfriendly actions, the mood would be 9, but a player taking an unfriendly
action would have threshold utility m0.
In the rules of the festival game Γ, each player i is allowed to go to any location
in L0 = {l1, ..., lT}. As mentioned in F9, we restrict the location choice of player i to
a nonempty subset Li of L0. As illustrated in (2.1), we are considering the repeated
situation of the festival game Γ and a stationary state expressed as a strategy profile
σ = (f, r) = ((f1, ..., fn), (r1, ..., rn)). The set Li is interpreted as consisting of the
locations that player i has experienced and is currently remembering. Since he goes
regularly to the location fi, we assume that
fi ∈ Li for all i ∈ N (2.8)
When (2.8) holds, we say that the location configuration f = (f1, ..., fn) is compatible
with an accessibility structure L = {Li}i∈N . The point of the introduction of L is to
limit the number of players who make trials. The following example shows a pattern of
such limitations.
In the example of Fig.2.1, one possible accessibility structure is given as
L1 = ... = L9 = {l1} (2.9)
L10 = L11 = {l1, l2, l3}, L12 = {l3, l2}, and L13 = L14 = L15 = {l3},
L16 = {l2, l1, l3}, and L17 = L18 = {l2}.
The players of ethnicity e1 have no experiences of locations l2 and l3. Those of ethnicity
e2 have various types: Players 10 and 11, staying at l1, have experiences of all locations,
while only player 12 among the people staying at l3 has explored another location l2,
but he has no eﬀective experience of l1. Player 16 is the only explorer among the players
of ethnicity e3.
Conceptually speaking, the accessibility structure L = {Li}i∈N is not included in
the rules of the game Γ. Instead, it has been developed in the history. For the sake of
convenience, however, we include L in the description of the festival game. That is, we
will formally regard L as an additional structure, that is, we consider the festival game
Γ(L) with the accessibility structure L.
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With the introduction of L, we should modify the strategy concept. An Li-strategy
for player i is given by a pair (fi, ri), where
fi ∈ Li and ri : 2{e1,...,eS} → {0, 1}. (2.10)
Recall that the first half is already given by (2.8). When Li = L0, this coincides with
the definition of a strategy given above. The set of Li-strategies for player i is denoted
by Σi(Li).We say that σ = (f, r) is an L-strategy profile iﬀ σi = (fi, ri) is an Li-strategy
for all i ∈ N. By Σ(L), we denote the set of profiles σ = (f, r) = ((f1, ..., fn), (r1, ..., rn))
with σi = (fi, ri) ∈ Σi(Li) for all i ∈ N . The payoﬀ function Hi for player i over Σ(L)
is defined in the same manner as (2.7). Now, we have the festival game with limited
access as the triple Γ(L) = hN, {Σi(Li)}i∈N , {Hi}i∈N i.
We now define the Nash equilibrium concept in the festival game Γ(L). We say that
an L-strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L) iﬀ for all i ∈ N ,
Hi(σ) ≥ Hi(σ−i,σ0i) for all σ0i ∈ Σi(Li). (2.11)
Here, we should repeat what was reported in Kaneko-Matsui [13]: We can replace (2.11)
by maximization over a narrower class of strategies. That is, in a deviation, a response
in the second stage does not need to take the ethnicity configuration into account.
Lemma 2.1. An L-strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L) if and only if for
any i ∈ N ,
Hi(σ) ≥ Hi(σ−i, (l, δi)) for all (l, δi) ∈ Li × {0, 1}. (2.12)
Here δi is regarded as a constant function over 2{e1,...,eS} taking a value from {0, 1}.
Proof. First consider a Nash equilibrium σ defined by (2.11). Since the individual
strategy domain in (2.11) includes that in (2.12). Hence, (2.11) implies (2.12).
We now prove that if σ = (f, r) satisfies (2.12), then it is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that player i takes a new strategy σ0i = (l, r
0
i) ∈ Σi(Li). Player i moves
to a location l and observes the ethnicity configuration Ei(f−i, l) = El(f). In the
festival l, his action is r0i(Ei(f−i, l)). In this case, his payoﬀ is determined by the action
r0i(Ei(f−i, l)); the functional structure of r
0
i is irrelevant but the function value is relevant.
Let δi = r0i(Ei(f−i, l)). Then (l, δi) ∈ Li × {0, 1} plays the same role as σ0i = (l, r0i), and
gives the same payoﬀ. Thus, the domain Σi(Li) of player i’s controllable variable in
(2.11) is restricted to Li × {0, 1}.
In the subsequent arguments, we will use (2.12) for the definition of Nash equilib-
rium. Nevertheless, we note that σi itself does not necessarily belong to Li × {0, 1}.
Simple behavior of taking actions is enough for deviations, but the responsive structure
described in r = (r1, ..., rn) is essential to attain the stability of a Nash equilibrium
against deviators. This responsive structure may include discriminatory behavior.
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We also make one more assumption on a Nash equilibrium σ = (f, r) to avoid
unnecessary complications:
Assumption M (Multiple Coethnic Players): If fi = l for some player i ∈ N, then
there is a coethnic player j at location l, i.e., fj = l and e(j) = e(i).
When there is a single player of ethnicity e at location l, we should take his response
to the presence of a coethnic player, since he notices it because of (2.2). This will cause
more considerations. However, it is a singular case for our theory, since, as stated by
F1, it is intended to consider a society with many player. Thus, we will always assume
Assumption M for a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent analysis.
2.3. Inductive Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium in Γ(L)
We adopt the Nash equilibrium concept, whose mathematical formulation is, more or
less, standard (cf. Luce-Raiﬀa [15]). Nevertheless, we interpret Nash equilibrium from
the inductive game theoretic viewpoint, which is needed for the problem of discrimina-
tion and prejudices. Here, we give a brief description of inductive game theory due to
Kaneko-Matusi [13] and Kaneko-Kline [11].
Inductive game theory consists of four stages:
(i) experimentation and transformation of short-term memories into long-term memo-
ries;
(ii) inductive derivation of a personal view from the long-term memories;
(iii) use of a personal view for his own decision making; and
(iv) bringing his decision from (iii) back to (i).
As discussed in [11], a strategy profile which is stationary through those stages is a
Nash equilibrium. In this paper, those four stages are compressed and only the result-
ing Nash equilibrium is considered. Still, some basic ideas of these stages are relevant
for an understanding of what we are doing in this paper. Therefore, we give a very brief
account of the relevant part.
In the recurrent situation described in (2.1), a strategy profile σ = (f, r) is tem-
porarily adopted by the players. Players do not know the structure of the game, but
behave following their behavior patterns. They make some deviations as trial and error
to get some information about the responses of other people. We assume that only a
small portion of players make trial deviations at one time; specifically, we consider only
unilateral deviations. Then, player i makes trial deviations on the locations in Li. Thus,
the memories from experiences are
Ei(σ) = {[(l, δi), Ei(f),Hi(σ−i, (l, δi))] : l ∈ Li and δi = 0, 1}. (2.13)
The values Ei(f) and Hi(σ−i, (l, δi)) are listed, but they are still unknown to player i
as functions.
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Having the set of experiences Ei(σ), player i finds a causal relationship (or corre-
lation) from (l, δi) to payoﬀ Hi(σ−i, (l, δi)). Then, he chooses a (l, δi) from Li × {0, 1}
to maximize Hi(σ−i, (l, δi)). He modifies the corresponding part of his behavior σi with
(l, δi). Now, he has the modified strategy σ0i and brings it to the recurrent situation in
(2.1). This corresponds to the stages (iii) and (iv) above. Then, the stage (i) restarts
again.
A strategy profile σ which is stationary through the above revision process for all
players is a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L). This was already discussed in Kaneko-Matsui
[13], and an inductive derivation of a personal view from Ei(σ) was the main subject
of [13]. Kaneko-Kline [11] gave a full scenario of stages (i)-(iv) in a general context of
extensive games.
In this paper, instead of the above described process, we start with Nash equilibrium
for the festival game Γ(L) with limited access. It is important to emphasize that the
foundation of our approach diﬀers from the ex ante game theory5. In the ex ante
game theory, the game structure is assumed to be (typically, commonly) known to all
players, and each player makes a rational decision before the actual play of the game.
This approach is unsuitable to our target phenomena of discrimination and prejudices,
since these are emerging as part of social custom and practices and are not purely from
rational decisions.
The limited experiences of players prevent us from applying the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium introduced in Selten [21]. The relevant subgame perfection in the
festival game requires payoﬀ maximization in response to a visiting player from some
other location. However, this needs a further deviation of each responder, which must
have a small frequency conditional upon the original trial deviation of a visiting player.
This needs too many repetitions of the game. See Kaneko-Matsui [13] for a detailed ar-
gument. They also considered subgame perfection from the viewpoint of an inductively
derived view (Section 4.3 in [13]).
3. Nash Equilibria of the Festival Game Γ(L) with Limited Access
In this and next sections, we analyze the set of Nash equilibria in the festival game Γ(L).
Here, we give a general characterization of the equilibrium set, which states that there
are a great variety of location choices by players. Then, in Section 4, we fix a location
configuration and study the set of equilibria relative to the location configuration. This
will be used for the introduction of a measure of discrimination in Section 5.
5Our inductive game scenario diﬀers from evolutionary game theory (cf. Weibull [22]) in that each
player makes a decision and keeps an identity over periods in our theory, while in evolution game
theory, a behavior pattern (strategy) is identical to a player and a change of a behavior is a change of a
generation. In evolutionary game theory, “memory” remains and/or is accumulated in the distribution
of behavior patterns; but in our theory, “memory” remains in the mind of a player.
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3.1. Active Festivals and Outliers
The purpose of this section is to classify the festivals into active and inactive festivals.
In a Nash equilibrium, some festivals may remain totally inactive. In the subsequent
sections, we will focus only on Nash equilibria with active festivals, ignoring inactive
festivals. Here, we clarify this assumption.
Let σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)) be a strategy profile in Γ(L). We say that l ∈ L0 is
active iﬀ fi = l and ri(Ei(f)) = 1 for some i ∈ N . Hence, location l is inactive if
and only if no players take friendly actions at l. Notice that the definition of an active
location is not parallel to that of an inactive location, that is, in an active location,
some players may possibly take unfriendly actions. However, this is not the case in
equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 (Polarization into Active and Inactive Festivals): Let σ = ((f1, r1),
..., (fn, rn)) be a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L). Then
(1): if ri(Ei(f)) = 1 for some i ∈ N, then rj(Ej(f)) = 1 for all j with fj = fi;
(2): if ri(Ei(f)) = 0 for some i ∈ N, then rj(Ej(f)) = 0 for all j with fj = fi.
Proof. Let ri(Ei(f)) = 1 for some i ∈ N. Then, Hi(σ) = ml(σ) 6= m0 since ml(σ) is an
integer but the threshold m0 is not. If Hi(σ) = ml(σ) < m0, then player i would get m0
by switching to unfriendly action 0, which is impossible since σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, Hi(σ) = ml(σ) > m0. This implies that every player at l should take friendly
action 1. Thus, we have proved (1), which implies (2).
In equilibrium, we have polarization into fully active festivals and inactive festivals;
everybody at an active festival takes a friendly action, and everybody at an inactive
festival takes an unfriendly action. In the latter, possibly an enough number of players
are staying there, but all are keeping to unfriendly actions. We call the players in inactive
festivals outliers. Outliers may be interpreted as “dropouts” or “homeless people” who
are living in small tents, say, in river banks in Tokyo or in streets of Kolkata. They are
isolated from the active festivals.
After Section 3, we will consider Nash equilibria without outliers. But since the
behaviors of outliers are somewhat interesting, we will characterize the set of Nash
equilibria taking them into account.
When Li = L0 = {l1, ..., lT} for all i ∈ N, it is shown in Kaneko-Matsui [13] that all
coethnic players go to a single location as far as there are active festivals involving those
players. Only it is possible in some Nash equilibria that coethnic players scatter over
locations having inactive festivals. In this paper, since we have a restriction on accessi-
ble locations L, some coethnic players may be separated into diﬀerent active festivals.
Theorem 3.2 (Avoidance of Outliers): Let σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)) be a Nash
equilibrium in Γ(L). Let i be an outlier, and l an active festival.
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(1): If outlier i has a coethnic player in location l, then i cannot access l, i.e., l /∈ Li.
(2): Suppose l ∈ Li. Then outlier i has no coethnic players in l, and the mood
ml(σ−i, (l, 1)) of l induced by the presence of outlier i is lower than the threshold utility
m0.
These state that either outlier i cannot access location l with coethnic players, or
he can access location l without coethnic players but if he actually goes, he would be
punished and experience even a lower utility than the threshold utility.
Proof. (1): Since l is an active festival and i an outlier, we have fi 6= l and ri(Ei(f)) = 0
by Lemma 3.1. Thus, Hi(σ) = m0. Since l is active, ml(σ) > m0. Let i have a coethnic
player at l. If l ∈ Li, then i can move to l to get a payoﬀ Hi(σ−i, (l, 1)) = ml(σ) + 1 >
m0 = Hi(σ). Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, we have l /∈ Li.
(2): Since l ∈ Li, by (1), l cannot have a player coethnic to i. Thus if i moves to
l, his presence will be observed. This will induce a decrease in the mood at l and
Hi(σ−i, (l, 1)) = ml(σ−i, (l, 1)). Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, Hi(σ−i, (l, 1)) ≤ Hi(σ) =
m0. Since ml(σ−i, (l, 1)) is an integer and m0 is not, ml(σ−i, (l, 1)) < m0.
3.2. Characterization of Nash equilibria in Γ(L)
When Li = L0 for all i ∈ N , the set of Nash equilibria is fully characterized in Kaneko-
Matsui [13]. In this paper, we have additional structures of limited observabilities
{∼e}e and limited accessible locations L = {Li}i∈N . With these limitations, we find
new phenomena in equilibrium. For example, some Nash equilibria allow the separation
of coethnic players into various locations. To investigate such phenomena, we introduce
two binary relations over locations, by which we will have a full characterization of
Nash equilibria (satisfying Assumption M). In this characterization, the role of limited
observabilities {∼e}e is covert, but it will be clear later.
For simplicity, we make Assumption M throughout the subsequent analysis.
Consider a location l and a strategy profile σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)), satisfying
Assumption M, with fi = l for some i with e(i) = e, and also consider another location
l0. Then we have two cases:
A: no players of ethnicity e at l can access l0;
B: some player i with e(i) = e at l can access l0; and either
B1: some coethnic player j is already at l0; or
B2: no players of ethnicity e are at l0.
Case A is irrelevant for the consideration of Nash equilibrium. Case B needs to be
considered and is divided into two subcases. Subcases B1 and B2 should be treated in
diﬀerent manners, since the presence of a player i at l0 is not observed in B1, while it is
in B2.
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For any e ∈ {e1, ..., eS} and any two distinct l, l0 ∈ L0 = {l1, ..., lT}, B, B1 and B2
are formulated as follows:
Bˆ: fi = l and l
0 ∈ Li for some i with e(i) = e;
Bˆ1: fj = l
0
for some coethnic j of i;
Bˆ2: player i has no coethnic player in festival l0.
These are simply mathematical expressions of B, B1 and B2. We write l
e½ l0 iﬀ Bˆ and
Bˆ1 hold, and l eÃ l0 iﬀ Bˆ and Bˆ2 hold. Also, we write l½ l0 (respectively, lÃ l0) when
l
e½ l0 (l eÃ l0) for some e ∈ {e1, ..., eS}.
When l
e½ l0 , player i with e(i) = e can go to l0 without being observed by the
players at l0. On the other hand, when l eÃ l0 , the presence of player i may be noticed by
the players at location l. Note that these relations are relative to a location configuration
f = (f1, ..., fn).
In Fig.3.1.(1), we assume that the players at l1 can access l2, but not the other
direction, which is expressed by the wall (dotted line) between l1 and l2. Here we have
l1
e2½ l2. On the other hand, since no players of e1 are at l2, the relation l1
e1Ã l2 holds.
We interpret the wall as the immigration barrier to prohibit the players at location l2
from coming to location l1. Then, l1 /∈ Lj for any j with fj = l2, for which reason, the
relation l2
e2½ l1 does not hold.
In Fig.3.1.(2), we assume that the immigration barrier is taken away but players
of e02 at l1 and players of e2 at l2 can distinguish between each other. In this case, the
relations l1
e02Ã l2 and l2
e2Ã l1 hold. It may still be possible that the people of e1 cannot
distinguish between e02 and e2. For example, people of e02 are Indians living in the US and
people of e2 are Indians from India. In fact, this is described by limited observabilities
{∼e}e.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 (One Direction): Let σ be a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L), e ∈ {e1, ..., eS},
and l, l
0 ∈ L0. If l
e½ l0 and at least one of l, l0 is active, then
(1): l is active and ml (σ) > ml0 (σ);
(2)(Asymmetry): l0½ l does not hold;
(3): l /∈ Lj for all j with fj = l0 and e(j) = e.
Proof. Consider (1). Let σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)) be a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L).
Suppose that l
e½ l0 and at least one of l, l0 is active. Then, there are some coethnic
players i, j of ethnicity e such that fi = l and fj = l0 ∈ Li. If l is inactive and l0 is active,
then player i can go to l0 and enjoy the festival at l0 since his presence is not found,
which is impossible since σ be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, l must be active. By Lemma
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Figure 3.1: Ethnic Barrier and Discrimination by Similar Players
3.1.(1), ri(fi, Ei(f)) = 1, and thus the payoﬀ to player i under σ is Hi(σ) = ml(σ). If i
moves to l0, his payoﬀ will be Hi(σ−i, (l0, 1)) = ml0(σ) + 1 and Hi(σ) ≥ Hi(σ−i, (l0, 1)),
i.e., ml(σ) > ml0(σ).
By (1), it is impossible to have l0 ½ l, i.e., (2). This implies not l0 e½ l. Hence, we
have (3).
Let us return to Fig.3.1.(1): If the immigration barrier prohibiting the players at l2
from coming to l1 was eliminated, then both l1
e2½ l2 and l2
e2½ l1 would hold. This is
incompatible with Asymmetry stated in Lemma 3.3, and hence, the immigration barrier
is needed to have Fig.3.1.(1) as an equilibrium location configuration.
Both ½ and e½ are irreflexive by definition. But, neither ½ nor e½ may be tran-
sitive, since ½ may depend upon e and since even if l e½ l0 and l0 e½ l00, all players of
ethnicity e at l may be prohibited to access l00.
The following is an important implication of Lemma 3.3.(1).
Corollary 3.4 (No Cycle Condition): Let σ be a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L). Let
{l1, ..., lk} a sequence of active locations and a chain with respect to ½, i.e., lt ½ lt+1
for t = 1, ..., k − 1. Then ml1(σ) > ml2(σ) > ... > mlk(σ). Thus, there are no cycles
with respect to½ .
The next result provides an insight into group formation in the festival game Γ(L).
It states that it is not the case that two coethnic players choose diﬀerent locations but
still can each access the other’s location. We state this as the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 (Group Formation): Consider an equilibrium location configuration
f = (f1, ..., fn). Let i and j be coethnic players. Then fj ∈ Li and fi ∈ Lj if and only
if fi = fj .
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Proof. The if part follows from (2.8). Consider the only-if part. Suppose that fj ∈ Li
and fi ∈ Lj . On the contrary, suppose fi = l 6= l0 = fj . Let e be the ethnicity of i, j.
Then, l
e½ l0 and l0 e½ l, which is impossible by Lemma 3.3.(2). Thus, l = l0.
We have been deriving necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L). In fact,
we have a full characterization of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.6 (Characterization of Nash Equilibria): Let σ be a profile of strate-
gies satisfying Assumption M. Then σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following
conditions (1), (2c) and (2n) hold: Let l, l
0 ∈ L0 and e ∈ {e1, ..., eS}. Then
(1)(Active Festivals): If l is active, then ml(f) > m0.
(2c)(Coethnic Players): If l
e½ l0 and at least one of l, l0 is active, then ml (σ) >
ml0 (σ);
(2n)(No Coethnic Players): If l eÃ l0 and i is a player of ethnicity e at l with l0 ∈ Li,
then ml(σ) ≥ ml0 (σ−i, (l
0
, 1)).
Proof. (Only-If ): Consider (1). Since there is a player i at l with ri(Ei(f)) = 1, we
have ml(f) = Hi(σ) ≥ Hi(σ−i, (l, 0)) = m0. Since m0 is not an integer, the inequality
must be strict. The other two conditions are already proved in Lemmas 3.3 and 2.1.
(If ): Let σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)) be any profile of strategies satisfying Assumption
M. Suppose conditions (1), (2c) and (2n). We will prove that σ is a Nash equilib-
rium in Γ(L). By Lemma 2.1, it suﬃces to show that for any player i and any trial
(fi, δi) ∈ Li × {0, 1} of i, Hi(σ) ≥ Hi(σ−i, (fi, δi)). Let e(i) = e, fi = l and consider
l0 ∈ Li with l0 6= l.
Now, suppose l
e½ l0 with l0 ∈ Li. Then the presence of player i at l0 is not observed,
where Assumption M is used. If both l and l0 are inactive, we have ml (σ) = ml0 (σ) = 0,
and player i’s payoﬀ is Hi(σ−i, (l0, 1)) = 1 < m0 = Hi(σ) and Hi(σ−i, (l0, 0)) = m0.
Suppose that at least one of l, l0 is active. Then, ml (σ) > ml0 (σ) by (2c), which implies
that l is active. Thus, using (1), Hi(σ) = ml (σ) > m0 = Hi(σ−i, (l
0
, 0)). Finally, from
ml (σ) > ml0 (σ), we have Hi(σ) = ml (σ) ≥ ml0 (σ) + 1 = Hi(σ−i, (l
0
, 1)).
Consider the case where l
eÃ l0 and i is a player with e(i) = e and l0 ∈ Li. Then by
(2n), Hi(σ) = ml(σ) ≥ ml0 (σ−i, (l
0
, 1)) = Hi(σ−i, (l
0
, 1)). Finally, consider the deviation
(l
0
, 0). If l is inactive, we have Hi(σ) = m0 = Hi(σ−i, (l0, 0)), and if l is active, we have,
using (1), Hi(σ) = ml(f) > m0 = Hi(σ−i, (l0, 0)).
Condition (1) of the theorem is part of Lemma 3.1, and (2c) is part of Lemma 3.3.
Condition (2n) is a specification of the statement given in Lemma 2.1. In fact, the limited
observabilities {∼e}e are involved but are covert in the abstract statement in ml(σ) ≥
ml0 (σ−i, (l
0
, 1)). In particular, the last term depends upon limited observabilities; this
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fact comes from (2.5) and (2.6). The inequality ml(σ) ≥ ml0 (σ−i, (l
0
, 1)) in (2n) will be
analyzed more.
Theorem 3.6 shows that the Nash equilibria of the festival game may involve the
partial or complete segregation of ethnicities. When a Nash equilibrium involves seg-
regation to any degree, it is sustained by ethnic discrimination. The relation between
segregation and discrimination will become clearer in the next section where we will
characterize the set of Nash equilibria relative to a given location configuration.
4. Nash Equilibria with a Given Location Configuration
From the viewpoint of inductive game theory, a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a par-
ticular state of society together with the history that led to the state. The state includes
a location configuration f , which is interpreted as a pattern of segregation. Our research
strategy is to focus on this location configuration, and to study the multiple Nash equi-
libria compatible with it, which vary in the degree of discrimination. Mathematically,
we characterize the set of Nash equilibria relative to a given location configuration f .
In particular, we show that this set has Nash equilibria involving a minimum amount of
discriminatory responses towards a visiting player. This will be used for the definition
of the discrimination measure in Section 5.
To avoid complications caused by the behavior of outliers, we only consider Nash
equilibria σ = ((f1, r1), ..., (fn, rn)) with a fixed f in Γ(L) satisfying Assumption M
and without outliers. The set of such Nash equilibria is denoted by Ξ(f,L). In those
equilibria, the mood ml(σ) at each location l is invariant over all Nash equilibria σ in
Ξ(f,L). Defining ml(f) := |{j : fj = l}| (the cardinality of this set) for l ∈ L0, we have
ml(f) = ml(σ) for any σ ∈ Ξ(f,L). (4.1)
Note that if we allow outliers, it may be the case that some location has only unfriendly
players in one equilibrium and all friendly in another equilibrium, so the invariance
result (4.1) does not hold.
We first give a criterion for the nonemptiness of Ξ(f,L).
Lemma 4.1 (Nonemptiness Criterion): Let f = (f1, ..., fn) be any location config-
uration compatible with L and satisfying Assumption M. Then Ξ(f,L) is nonempty if
and only if
(1): for any l, l0 ∈ L0, l0
e½ l implies ml0(f) > ml(f);
(2): for any l, l0 ∈ L0, l0
eÃ l implies that the original mood at l0 is larger than the
number of players at l who cannot perceive the presence of e, i.e.,
ml0(f) >
¯¯{j : fj = l and (Ej(f) ∪ {e})/ ∼e(j)= Ej(f)/ ∼e(j)}¯¯ (4.2)
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Recall that the quotient set relative to ∼e(j) is defined in (2.5). Without the intro-
duction of limited observabilities {∼e}e, every player at l could observe the presence of
ethnicity e, and thus (2) would be redundant. However, with {∼e}e, many players may
not perceive the presence of e, and hence we need (2).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. (Only If ): Let Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅. Consider σ ∈ Ξ(f,L). Since there
are no outliers in σ and all players act friendly in equilibrium, any nonempty location
is active.
Consider (1) and let l, l0 ∈ L0 with l
e½ l0. Since both l and l0 are active, we have
ml(f) > ml0(f) by Lemma 3.3.(1).
Consider (2). The right term of (4.2) is the number of players finding no diﬀerence
in ethnicities at l with the presence of e and keeping friendly actions to the presence
of e. This is the minimal mood possibly induced by e. If this was larger than or equal
to ml0(f), we cannot prevent a player i at l0 with l ∈ Li and e(i) = e from going to
location l, and thus Ξ(f,L) is empty. Hence, when Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅, we have (4.2).
(If): We prove Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅ under (1) and (2). For all i ∈ N , we define ri : 2{e1,...,eS} →
{0, 1} by
ri(E) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if E/ ∼e(i)= Ei(f)/ ∼e(i)
0 otherwise.
(4.3)
It suﬃces to show that σ = (f, r) is a Nash equilibrium in Γ(L). There are two possible
cases with respect to a player i coming to location l: either (i) he has a coethnic player
at l or (ii) he has no coethnic player present at l.
In Case (i), we have l0
e½ l with fi = l0, l ∈ Li and e = e(i). By (1), we have
ml0(f) > ml(f). Thus, it is better to stay at his original location l0. Consider Case (ii).
By (4.3), all players at l who finds the presence of player i act unfriendly. The mood
induced at l is the right term of (4.2), possibly plus 1, and does not exceed ml0(f).
Hence, σ is a Nash equilibrium and Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅.
When Ξ(f,L) is nonempty, we call f = (f1, ..., fn) an equilibrium location configu-
ration. This can be interpreted as a stable pattern of segregation.
For the subsequent analysis, we introduce the notion of conditional mood
ml(σ | e) = ml((f, r) | e) when a player i of ethnicity e = e(i) with fi 6= l comes to l.
This is given as
ml(σ | e) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ml(σ−i, (l, 1)) if e /∈ El(f)
ml(σ) + 1 if e ∈ El(f).
(4.4)
Recall El(f) = {e(j) : fj = l} defined by (2.3). In the second case, some coethnic player
of i is already in location l and player i with e(i) = e comes to l; thus the last +1 counts
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his presence at l. Using this notation, when player i with e(i) = e and l ∈ Li goes to
location l, his payoﬀ is represented by ml(σ | e), i.e.,
Hi(σ−i, (l, 1)) = ml(σ | e). (4.5)
This notation will simplify our subsequent analysis.
The set Ξ(f,L) consists of many Nash equilibria, and its multiplicity corresponds
to the degree of discriminatory responses to a visiting player. Our present aim is to
measure this degree. For this, we first focus on a particular location l and on the
players who possibly visit l. Using the binary relations
e½ and eÃ introduced in Section
3, the visitors fall into the two cases:
(Coethnic Players): l0
e½ l;
(No Coethnic Players): l0 eÃ l.
In these two cases, we would like to measure the degree of discrimination induced by a
player from the outside. To do this, we first need to examine the induced mood at l.
We note that we always make Assumption M without mentioning in the following.
The first lemma states that in the case of l0
e½ l, no discrimination is induced, and
the mood is invariant over all Nash equilibria in Ξ(f,L).
Lemma 4.2 (No Discrimination to Coethnic Players): Let l0
e½ l. Then,
ml(σ | e) = ml(σ0 | e) = ml(σ) + 1 for any σ,σ0 ∈ Ξ(f,L).
Proof. By (4.4), ml(σ | e) = ml(σ) + 1 = ml(f) + 1 = ml(σ0) + 1 = ml(σ0 | e).
The next result is actually more important for Section 5. Recall that a Nash equilib-
rium consists of location-response choices for all players in the entire game Γ. However,
the discrimination degree against a visiting player at a location can be local to his lo-
cation, rather than global to the entire game. The next result guarantees that we can
restrict ourselves to a single location and a single ethnicity, independent of the remain-
ing part.
Theorem 4.3 (Localization): Let σ = (f, r) ∈ Ξ(f,L). Let e be an ethnicity with
e /∈ El(f). Suppose that any {roj (El(f) ∪ {e})}fj=l satisfies
ml0(f) ≥
P
fj=l
roj (E
l(f) ∪ {e}) + 1 for all l0 with l0 eÃ l. (4.6)
Then, we define r0 by replacing the part {rj(El(f) ∪ {e})}fj=l of r by {roj (El(f) ∪
{e})}fj=l. Then σ0 = (f, r0) ∈ Ξ(f,L).
Proof. We prove that the newly defined σ0 = (f, r0) is a Nash equilibrium. Note that
it diﬀers from σ = (f, r) only in the domain of r where a player i with fi = l0
eÃ l
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and e(i) = e i goes to location l. Consider a player i with fi = l0
eÃ l and e(i) = e.
If player i goes to location l, his payoﬀ becomes
P
fj=l
roj (E
l(f) ∪ {e}) + 1, which is
smaller than or equal to his present payoﬀ ml0(f) by (4.6). Player i’s deviation not to go
to l would meet the response described by the original r, and hence, does not induce a
higher payoﬀ. Finally, If l0 eÃ l does not hold or e(i) 6= e, then any deviation of player i
would meet the responses described by the original r. Thus, his deviation does not give
a higher payoﬀ than ml0(f).
Theorem 4.3 enables us to focus on discriminatory responses at the local level. Then,
we can combine the responses from those local levels into one equilibrium. The following
corollary illustrates this in the context of minimal discrimination, and is used in Section
5.
Corollary 4.4.(Minimal Degrees of Discrimination): Let Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅. There is
a Nash equilibrium σ in Ξ(f,L) such that for any l0 with l0 e½ l or l0 eÃ l, ml(σ | e) ≥
ml(σ0 | e) for any σ0 in Ξ(f,L).
Proof. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium in Ξ(f,L). By Lemma 4.2, we do not need to think
about the case of l0
e½ l. Now, consider l0 eÃ l. Suppose that ml(σ | e) < ml(σ0 | e) for
some σ0 in Ξ(f,L) and this ml(σ0 | e) is the maximum for (l, e). Then, we replace the
part {rj(El(f)∪{e}}fj=l of r by {r0j(El(f)∪{e})}fj=l, and we have the new σ1. This σ1
is a Nash equilibrium in Ξ(f,L) by Theorem 4.3. We continue this replacement process
until no new pair (l, e) is found.
Corollary 4.4 asserts the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Ξ(f,L) having the mini-
mum amount of discriminatory reactions against any visiting player. This describes the
necessary degree of discrimination needed to maintain the given location configuration.
This will be used in the definition of the measure of discrimination in Section 5.
5. Measure of Discrimination
In this section, we define a measure of discrimination relative to a given location con-
figuration f , and then analyze the properties of this measure6. There are many Nash
equilibria with respect to a given location configuration f. Accordingly, the degree of
discrimination depends upon a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, it would be useful to
have a unidimensional measure indicating the degree of discrimination necessarily in-
volved. We define our measure so that it gives the minimum degree of discrimination
needed to sustain f as an equilibrium configuration. What we intend to capture by this
measure will be explained presently.
6The term “measure” is technically unrelated to the notion of a “measure” in mathematics. Con-
ceptually, both mean that they measure amounts, quantities or degrees of something or some states.
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Let f = (f1, ..., fn) be an equilibrium location configuration in Γ(L) satisfying As-
sumption M, and l ∈ L0. Some ethnicity e may irrelevant for the consideration of
discrimination at location l; for example, no player of e has ever been present at l or all
players of e are only found in l. We define the set of relevant ethnicities for location l
by
El(f,L) = {e : l0 e½ l for some l0} ∪ {e : l0 eÃ l for some l0}. (5.1)
These are the ethnicities so that some of them may visit location l. The discrimination
measure df (e | l) is defined over this set.
Now, we define the discrimination measure df (e | l) as follows: for any l ∈ L0 and
any e ∈ El(f,L),
df (e | l) = min
σ∈Ξ(f,L)
[ml(f)− (ml(σ | e)− 1)]. (5.2)
Recall that ml(σ | e), defined by (4.4), is the total mood conditional upon the presence
of a player of ethnicity e, which counts that player. The −1 term in (5.2) eliminates the
eﬀect of that player on the mood at l. Thus, the diﬀerence ml(f)− (ml(σ | e)−1) is the
pure change in the mood at location l caused by ethnicity e. We take the minimum of
such diﬀerences over all possible Nash equilibria in Ξ(f,L). In sum, df (e | l) expresses
the degree of discrimination that will inevitably occur at location l against ethnicity e.
Now, let us look at an example, which suggests what questions we should address. In
Fig.1.1, we assume that all ethnicities are observably distinct. The location configuration
presented in the figure can be sustained by many Nash equilibria. For example, in
one equilibrium, all players at l1 may discriminate against a visiting player from l2.
In another equilibrium, only some players at l1 may discriminate. The discrimination
measure df (e2 | l1) is the minimum amount of discrimination needed to keep e2 away
from l1, which is seen to be the height AB. Similarly, the discrimination measure df (e3 |
l1) is seen to be CD. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the ethnicity from a smaller festival
faces more discrimination.
The minimum discrimination degree df (e | l) is the minimum welfare loss associated
with discriminatory behavior needed to sustain the segregation pattern f. In this paper,
we do not address an analysis of partial and/or total welfare losses associated with
segregation, though it is an important problem.
Although the above argument seems clear, a rigorous derivation of the discrimination
measure needs to find an equilibrium supporting the minimum degree of discrimination.
This is a complex task in a general setting rather than an example. The method of
calculating df (e | l) needs to be developed.
We start with a simple case and proceed to more general cases.
Lemma 5.1 (Calculation 1)(1): Let l, l0 ∈ L0 and l0
e0½ l, then df (e0 | l) = 0.
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Figure 5.1: Eﬀect of a Similar Ethnicity
(2): Let l, l0 ∈ L0, ml(f) > ml0(f) > 0 and l0
e0Ã l. Then, df (e0 | l) ≥ ml(f)−(ml0(f)−1).
The first claim simply states that a visiting player of ethnicity e will face no discrim-
ination (with respect the minimum degree) at l if he has coethnic players there. The
second states that when a player i is a visitor from a smaller festival l0 to a larger festival
l, the minimum discrimination he faces is the diﬀerence between the regular moods of
the festivals. The last term −1 is to remove the eﬀect of player i’s contribution to l0.
When we talk about interpretations of some results, we often ignore the this term such
as the above comparisons of the rectangles of Fig.1.1.
Proof.(1): Let l0
e0½ l. By Lemma 4.2, ml(σ | e0) = ml(σ) + 1 = ml(f) + 1 does not
depend upon σ ∈ Ξ(f,L). Hence, df (e0 | l) = 0.
(2): Suppose that df (e0 | l) < ml(f)−ml0(f)+1. There is a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Ξ(f)
such that df (e0 | l) = ml(f)− (ml(σ | e)− 1) < ml(f)−ml0(f) + 1. Let i be a player at
l0 with e(i) = e0 and l ∈ Li. Then, Hi(σ−i, (l, 1)) = ml(σ | e) > ml0(f) = Hi(σ). This is
a contradiction to that σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Here, we introduce one definition to save mathematical expressions. Let E be a set
of ethnicities and e an ethnicity. We say that e is ethnically distinguishable from E at
location l iﬀ for all e00 ∈ El(f),
e ¿e00 e0 for all e0 ∈ E. (5.3)
Using this definition, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Calculation 2): Let l ∈ L0 and e ∈ El(f,L). Assume that e is
ethnically distinguishable from the set {e0 : e0 6= e, l0 e0Ã l and ml0(f) < ml(f) for some
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l0} at location l. Then we have the following.
(1): Suppose that ml0(f) ≥ ml(f) for all l0 with e ∈ El
0
(f). Then df (e | l) = 0.
(2): Suppose that l0 eÃ l and ml0(f) < ml(f) for some l0. Then df (e | l) is given as
df (e | l) = ml(f)− min
l0 eÃl
ml0(f) + 1. (5.4)
The assumption of ethnic distinguishability of e at l is needed for these results, since
otherwise, some players at l may respond to e in the same way as to other ethnicities.
When this assumption does not hold, even in (1), ethnicity e may be confused with some
other ethnicity e0 at location l and be discriminated against; hence, the value df (e | l)
could be positive. In (2), for a similar reason, the value df (e | l) could be larger than
that given in (5.4). Thus, our calculation method is restrictive, but the above results
may still be used.
Let us look at the above results in an example. In Fig.5.1, the players at locations
l1, l2, l3 can access the other locations. The players of ethnicity e1 can distinguish all
between e01, e1 and e2, and the players of e2 can distinguish themselves from e1 and
e01, but not between e1 and e01. The ethnic distinguishability assumption of the theorem
holds for e2 at location l1, and for e01 at location l2. Hence, when a player comes from
l2 to l1, or from l3 to l2, we have (2), i.e., he would meet the minimum discrimination
df (e2 | l1) = ml1(f) − ml2(f) + 1, or df (e01 | l2) = ml2(f) − ml3(f) + 1, described
in Fig.5.1. Furthermore, when a player comes from l3 to l1, we have the minimum
discrimination df (e01 | l1) = ml1(f)−ml3(f) + 1. Those are all obtained by (2).
A player from either l1 or l2 meets the 0-minimum discrimination, i.e., df (e1 | l3) =
df (e2 | l3) = 0, which is (1).
Now, suppose that the players of ethnicities e1 and e01 are similar and cannot be
distinguished by the players of ethnicity e2. When player i from l1 visits l2, the players
at l2 cannot distinguish him from e01 people, and thus player i meets at least df (e01 | l2)
amount of discrimination. Here, we have mutual discrimination between ethnicities e1
and e2 even in the sense of minimum discrimination. This may capture a certain aspect
of conflicts between diﬀerent ethnicities.
Certainly, it would be important to analyze the behavior of the discrimination mea-
sure without the assumption of ethnic distinguishability. Some results will be given in
Section 6.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2.(1): Consider a Nash equilibrium σ given in Corollary 4.4.
Let i be a player with fi = l0 and e(i) = e. In that Nash equilibrium σ, it must hold
that
ml(σ | e) = ml(σ−i, (l, 1)) = ml(f) + 1. (5.5)
This implies df (e | l) = 0 by (5.2). Let us see the reason for (5.5). Since ml0(f) ≥ ml(f)
for all l0 with e ∈ El0(f), any player of e has no incentive to go to location l, even
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if no discrimination is expected at l. Only the ethnicities in the set {e0 : l0 e0Ã l and
ml0(f) < ml(f) for some l0} are relevant for discriminatory responses. But e is ethni-
cally distinguished from those ethnicities. Hence, no discriminatory responses to the
presence of e are required at l to sustain a Nash equilibrium. Hence, in the maximum
Nash equilibrium, no discrimination occurs if e comes to location l. This is (5.5).
(2): Let mlo(f) = min
l0 eÃl
ml0(f) and lo
eÃ l. Let σ be any Nash equilibrium in Ξ(f,L).
Then, since l is accessible for some player j in lo with e(i) = e, we have ml(σ | e) ≤
mlo(f). Since σ is arbitrary in Ξ(f,L), we have max
σ∈Ξ(f,L)
ml(σ | e) ≤ mlo(f). Any ethnic-
ity e0 at a location l0 with a lower mood than mlo(f) can be ethnically distinguishable
from e by the assumption of the theorem. Hence, it suﬃces to decrease the mood at
location l to mlo(f) so as to prevent the visit of player i to l. Thus, the minimum degree
of discrimination is mlo(f), and we can find a Nash equilibrium σo by Corollary 5.4 so
that ml(σo | e) = mlo(f). Thus, max
σ∈Ξ(f,L)
ml(σ | e) = mlo(f). Now, we have
max
l0 eÃl
[ml(f)−ml0(f)+1] = ml(f)−mlo(f)+1 = ml(f)− max
σ∈Ξ(f,L)
ml(σ | e)+1 = df (e | l).
When any players at l cannot distinguish between e0 and e00, they are treated as the
same ethnicities at least at location l. The following is the result about these similar
players as targets.
Theorem 5.3 (Similar Players as Targets): Let Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅. Consider an location
l and two ethnicities e0, e00 ∈ El(f,L). Suppose that e0 ∼e e00 for all e ∈ El(f). Then,
df (e
0 | l) = df (e00 | l).
Proof. Suppose l0
e0½ l or l0 e
0
Ã l. Then, all the players at l cannot distinguish between
e0 and e00. Hence, their responses to the presence of e00 are the same. Hence df (e0 | l) =
df (e
00 | l).
We have seen how to calculate the discrimination measure under the assumption of
ethnic distinguishability. Once calculation becomes possible, we use it for comparisons,
for example, of the discrimination faced by diﬀerent ethnicities at a location. In the
definition of df (· | ·), however, minimization is taken over the set Ξ(f,L) for a given
location l and a given ethnicity e. Thus, discrimination faced by diﬀerent ethnicities
at a location may be supported by diﬀerent Nash equilibria, which represent diﬀerent
realizations of the social state. However, the next result states that we can avoid this
complication, which follows from Corollary 4.4.
Theorem 5.4 (Uniformity). Let Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅. Then there is a Nash equilibrium
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σo ∈ Ξ(f,L) such that for all l ∈ L0 and all e ∈ El(f,L),
df (e | l) = ml(f) + 1−ml(σo | e). (5.6)
This result allows us to compare the discrimination faced by diﬀerent ethnic groups
in a single Nash equilibrium. This will be helpful in the next section, where we provide
two applications of this measure.
6. Ethnic Hierarchy, Similarity, and Distances
In Section 5, we have defined a measure of discrimination and provided a method of
calculating the measure. This section demonstrates the applicability of this measure by
using it to investigate discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy and discrimination between
groups perceived as similar to one another. It should be pointed out that these phenom-
ena are not mutually exclusive and may be observed in the same situation. It should
also be reemphasized that there are many other discriminatory phenomena which can
be observed in the festival game. We have focused on these cases because they are
enough to make the applicability of the discrimination measure clear and to show that
our model generates patterns of discrimination consistent with evidence from sociology
and social psychology.
6.1. Ethnic Hierarchy
In Section 1.3, we gave an idea of ethnic hierarchy and its eﬀect on discrimination using
Fig.1.1. Also, Theorem 5.2 already includes some ethnic hierarchy, but we would like
to make it more explicit.
Theorem 6.1 (Ethnic Hierarchy): Let Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅ and l1 ∈ L0. Let l2, ..., lk ∈ L0
be the enumerated locations whose moods are less than that of l1. Consider ethnicities
e2, ..., ek, and suppose that for t = 2, ..., k,
(a): et is found only in location lt among l2, ..., lk and lt e
t
Ã l1;
(b): et is ethnically distinguishable from {e : e 6= et and l eÃ l1 for some l = l2, ..., lk}
at l1.
Then, df (et | l1) = ml1(f) −mlt(f) + 1 for any t = 2, ..., k. When ml1(f) > ml2(f) >
... > mlk(f), we have
df (e
2 | l1) < ... < df (ek | l1). (6.1)
Proof. By (b), the ethnic distinguishability assumption of Theorem 5.2 holds. By (a),
lt
etÃ l1 and et is in lt among l1, ..., lk. Hence, df (et | l1) = ml1(f)− mlt(f) + 1. Thus,
we have (6.1).
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Thus, (6.1) shows a hierarchy of ethnicities at location l1. People of lower ranked
ethnic groups would meet severer discrimination against them than those of higher
ranked groups. Also, it follows from Lemma 5.1 that people of higher ranked groups
would not meet any discrimination against at location l1, unless they have similar players
in lower ranked locations. This hierarchical structure is found rather universally for any
groups unless the ethnic confusions occur.7
Our result can be interpreted as showing the eﬀect of ethnic stratification on dis-
crimination (cf., Marger [16]). A specific instance is discussed in Hagendoorn et al [6],
who conducted an empirical study of ethnic relations in the former Soviet union. They
showed that discrimination follows a hierarchical structure in that the magnitude of dis-
crimination is inversely related to the social position of a group in the ethnic hierarchy.
This is closer to and quite consistent with the above result.
6.2. Ethnic Distance and Similarity
With limited observabilities {∼e}e, we can find phenomena quite diﬀerent from Theorem
6.1. When an ethnic group e far away from two other similar groups e0 and e00 in ethnic
distance, the group e may regard the groups e0 and e00 as the same. But those groups
e0 and e00 themselves can distinguish between themselves by finding physical or cultural
diﬀerences (see Marger [16], Chap.2). Some discrimination may happen between them
though they are almost regarded as identical from the others’ perspective. For instance,
Chinese Australian can distinguish new Chinese immigrants from themselves, but others
typically cannot. The former may discriminate against the latter. We have an abundant
of such examples. The following result is a possible formulation of this observation.
Theorem 6.2 (Ethnic Distance and Discrimination by Similar Players): Let
Ξ(f,L) 6= ∅, l, l0 ∈ L0, and let e1 ∈ El(f), e2 ∈ El0(f) with l0 e
2
Ã l. Then, suppose that
e1 ∼e e2 for all e ∈ El(f)\{e1} and e1 ¿e1 e2. Then,
(1): in any equilibrium in Ξ(f,L), any discriminator against e2 at l is a player of e1;
(2):
¯¯{i : e(i) = e1 and fi = l}¯¯ ≥ df (e2 | l).
Proof.(1): When a player of ethnicity e2 visits location l, his presence is observed only
by the players of e1, and hence only those players are possible discriminators against a
player of e2.
(2): Only the discriminators against e2 at l are e1 people. The value df (e2 | l) is
7While it is generally true that a superior group discriminates more against a subordinate group
of low position in the ethnic hierarchy than against one of relatively higher position, there is also
some evidence from social psychology that a superior group may exhibit magnanimity when the status
diﬀerential with the subordinate group is perceived as unbreachably wide. We do not consider this
possibility.
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sustained by the discrimination by those people. Hence, there are at least df (e2 | l)
number of e1 people in location l.
The supposition of the theorem means that e1 and e2 are close in ethnic distance and
similar for all other ethnicities at l. However, they can distinguish between each other.
Then, all discriminators against e2 are of ethnicity e1; only akin people discriminate.
The number of e1 players has to be greater than or equal to df (e2 | l); otherwise f
would not be an equilibrium configuration - see Lemma 4.1.
In conclusion, we have shown certain possible applications of our approach. There
are many phenomena which we may discuss by our approach by modifying and/or
extending it. Those should belong to future research agenda.
7. Prejudices and Personal Views
Up to the previous section, the limited observabilities of ethnicities expressed by {∼e}e
have played a more explicit role in the study of discrimination than limited accessible
locations L = {Li}i∈N . On the other hand, prejudice is a (negative) view of other
ethnicities and is often related to passive experiences. Limited accessible locations L
may classify individual experiences into active and passive ones. This will add a large
scope of research into prejudices to the approach of Kaneko-Matsui [13]. In this section,
we give a very brief discussion on a possible study of prejudices in the present framework.
Let us illustrate the new phenomena captured in the present framework, using
Fig.7.1. Consider the location configuration described in it. This is an equilibrium
configuration with various limited accessible locations L. In [13], it is assumed that
LEi = {l1, l2, l3} for all i ∈ N ; every player i of ethnicity et (t = 1, 2, 3) stays regularly at
lt and sometimes goes to the other locations. He is an explorer having active experiences,
and has also passive experiences caused by a visiting player from the other locations.
The players at location lt have those experiences uniformly, while possibly some players
respond diﬀerently when a visiting player comes to lt. Thus, only two types of players at
lt. They may develop a simple explanatory view of those experiences, and some others
may construct a more complicated explanatory view for them ([13], Section 6).
Contrary to the above, we have much more freedom for L = {Li}i∈N . The extreme
opposite case is: LCi = {lt} for all players i with e(i) = et and t = 1, 2, 3, i.e., all
are conservative and nobody makes a trial deviation. In this case, each player has no
experiences other than his own festival. Player i at lt may have no idea about the other
locations and no explanation is required. In this case, it is a possible personal view
that location lt is a sole world for him. In fact, any personal view with an imaginary
structure about the other world is compatible with his experience.
The above is a poor and uninteresting case. In fact, however, there are many in-
termediate cases between LE = {LEi }i∈N and LC = {LCi }i∈N . In the following, we
30
1l 2l 3l
1e 2e 3e
typ eE −
typ eE −
typ eE −
typ eC −
typ eC −
typ eC −
E -- e x p lo re rs
C  -- c o n se rv a tiv e s  
Figure 7.1: Variety of Players of Diﬀerent Types
consider an intermediate one LM = {LMi }i∈N , where at each location lt, a majority
of players are conservative (C-type), and the remaining minority consists of explorers
(E-type). This situation is described in Fig.7.1.
Suppose that player i at location lt, say, lt = l2, is of C-type. Then, he has only
passive experiences to have visiting players from l1 and l3. In the following, we assume
that a visiting player to l2 takes only a friendly action. In the minimum discrimination
equilibrium described by Corollary 4.4, player i’s has the following three experiences:
(1): [(l2, 1), {e2, e1},ml2(f) + 1] — a visitor comes from location l1;
(2): [(l2, 1), {e2},ml2(f)] — his regular stay at l2;
(3n): [(l2, 1), {e2, e3},ml2(f)−df (e3 | l2)+1] — a visitor comes from l3, induces discrim-
inatory responses, but player i is not a discriminator;
(3d): [(l2, 1), {e2, e3},m0] — a visitor comes from l3 and he behaves as a discriminator.
Since the number of players is large as stated by F1 in Section 2.1, we assume that the
additional +1 is ignored.
Consider case (1,2,3n). Then, player i is indiﬀerent about the presence of a visiting
player of e1, i.e., the utility value for (1) is (approximately) the same as that for (2).
However, his utility value decreases a lot with the presence of a visiting player of e3.
Hence, he needs to explain this fact. One simple explanation for this pattern is the
naive hedonistic view (Kaneko-Matsui [13]). Player i has a preference against e3 but
is indiﬀerent about e1. In the case of (1,2,3d), an explanation is similar, though his
response to the presence of e3 becomes unfriendly.
When player i is of E-type, he has the following two experiences in addition to (1)-
(3) in the minimum discrimination equilibrium:
(4): [(l1, 1), Ei(σ−i, (l1, 1)),Hi(σ−i, (l1, 1))] = [(l1, 1), {e1},ml2(f)] — player i goes to
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location l1;
(5): [(l3, 1), Ei(σ−i, (l3, 1)),Hi(σ−i, (l3, 1))] = [(l3, 1), {e3},ml3(f) + 1] — player i goes to
location l3.
Observe that (4) is similar to (1). That is, the utility values in (4) and in (1) are
(approximately) the same. He may think that this same utility value is caused by the
common component e1 in [(l2, 1), {e2, e1}] and [(l1, 1), {e1}]. Hence, (1) and (4) may be
explained in the same manner. In the same manner, (3n) and (5) may be explained.
Thus, player i does not need to extend his native hedonistic explanation.
The above argument relies upon the minimum discrimination equilibrium of Corol-
lary 4.4. In a diﬀerent equilibrium, a E-type player needs to develop a more sophisticated
personal view than a C-type player.
The purpose of this section is simply to point out that our approach has more
potential in the consideration of prejudices. When player i has various diﬀerent types of
coethnic players, he may communicate others to have others’ views. In this respect, our
approach gives a framework for communication. Also, if he has more knowledge about
the entire situation, he could think about more sophisticated views. To consider such a
possibility, we would take the epistemic logic approach more seriously, which has been
developed but still some distance to our purpose (cf., Kaneko [8], Kaneko-Suzuki [10]).
8. Conclusions
This paper provided an analysis of discrimination and the associated phenomenon of
segregation from the perspective of inductive game theory. Social interaction was mod-
eled as the festival game of Kaneko-Matsui [13], which was extended in this paper by
introducing additional constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on loca-
tions accessible by the players. These additional components enabled us to study the
problem of discrimination in greater detail.
More specifically, we provided a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium
set of the festival game with limited access, adopting the inductive game theory per-
spective developed in [13] and Kaneko-Kline [11], [12]. We subsequently characterized
the set of Nash equilibria relative to a given location configuration. This allowed us
to introduce a measure of discrimination, interpreted as the minimum degree of dis-
crimination needed to sustain a given location configuration. We then provided a few
applications of this measure.
As mentioned before, the dual constraints of limited observability and limited access
lead to a much richer structure of the Nash equilibrium set than is seen in the festival
game of Kaneko-Matsui. The modified game environment reveals a greater variety of
discriminatory behavior and stable patterns of segregation sustained by such discrim-
inatory behavior. In Sections 5 and 6, we singled out some of these phenomena using
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the measure of discrimination. However, there are much more phenomena than we have
been able to consider in this paper and an exploration of these will be a part of future
research.
We have briefly pointed out in Section 7 that the additional structures imposed
on the festival game have great potential for the study of prejudices. While a detailed
study of prejudice from the perspective of inductive game theory will be given in a future
paper, we believe we have taken an initial step in this direction and more generally, in
the direction of applying inductive game theory to the study of social phenomena.
Conceptually, an analysis of the emergence of prejudices is important for the con-
tinuation of our research on discrimination. In this paper, we have only considered
“passive” discrimination in the sense that when a player of a diﬀerent ethnicity visits
a festival, the players have discriminatory responses, but there is no “active” (or in-
stitutional) discrimination in the sense that they do not organize political campaigns
or develop institutional arrangements to intensify discrimination against some ethnic
groups. Active discrimination may occur when prejudices associated with passive dis-
crimination is developed and a trigger is pulled. It will be possible to consider this when
passive discrimination and the emergence of prejudices are fully analyzed.
In conclusion, the festival game captures social interaction in a highly abstract man-
ner, concentrating on discriminatory behaviors that arise as a part of group formation
and eliminating other social-economic components. Due to this abstraction, we are able
to study various forms of segregation patterns and discriminatory behaviors. These are
suggestive for empirical studies of intergroup relations. Nevertheless, we admit that our
theory cannot directly be connected to empirical studies; both because it is a highly
simplified and focused theory on discrimination and prejudices and because in reality,
institutional backgrounds such as colonialism may be too significant to be ignored. Our
theory is suitable to a heuristic use for the study of discrimination and prejudices.
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